Power in the Evaluation of Inclusionary Housing Programs

Abstract Information: Residents of affordable housing programs have long fought for more influence in shaping and evaluating their housing conditions (Rodriguez, 2021; Juravich, 2017; Thurber et al., 2020). Resident organizing has successfully created some mechanisms for resident participation in implementing and evaluating federal affordable housing programs. For example, Public Housing Authorities are required to include elected Housing Choice Voucher holders in a Resident Advisory Board (when voucher holders comprise at least 20% of households served) to make recommendations to the housing authority’s plans (Gramlich, 2021). While the power these entities have over the operations of the programs is questionable, local programs and those launched more recently may not include any mechanisms for beneficiary participation. We utilize the three-dimensional conceptualization of power first developed by Lukes (1974) and further elaborated by Gaventa (1980) and VeneKlasen & Miller (2002). We look at power in one housing program, asking how are municipalities and external researchers evaluating inclusionary housing (IH) programs, and whose perspectives are included in those evaluations? To address this question, this study uses mixed methods, including semi-structured key informant interviews, archival research of municipal IH reports, and a systematic review of the literature. Through interviews with nine IH program administrators in municipalities across the country, we found that few municipalities report doing any kind of formal evaluation of their programs. Although many said they present data to elected officials annually or write annual reports, the data they collect and use to assess the impact of their programs centers the developers’ and municipalities’ interests, with residents’ interests deprioritized. Even when municipalities collect information on criteria in residents’ interest, they use information from developers or their own records, failing to ask those residents directly. Similarly, few researchers consider residents’ experiences as part of IH evaluations. We searched the academic literature for evaluations that included IH residents’ well-being. In twelve academic articles by ten first authors evaluating the outputs or outcomes of specific IH programs, only two considered the program’s effects on intended beneficiaries. Visible power (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2002), which relates to who wins overt conflict, appears in IH evaluations as insufficient attention to residents’ interests. To increase resident visible power, we recommend municipalities and evaluators collect data directly from residents in evaluations of IH. Hidden power (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2002) is the power to set the agenda. In IH evaluations, hidden power emerges in the epistemological assumptions about where power lies and whose knowledge is valid. Additionally, the hidden power of research funders determines the kinds of knowledge researchers create. To increase resident hidden power, we recommend using participatory evaluation designs that privilege the participation of residents, as well as including low-income residents in research grant decision-making. Invisible power (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2002) prevents lower-power groups from recognizing their grievances, thus preventing overt conflict. In IH evaluations, this shows up as the spatial isolation of IH residents, which creates significant barriers to seeing their individual concerns as group concerns. We recommend increasing resident invisible power by facilitating the creation of municipality-wide IH tenants’ unions.